DD - MVT 2
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1
Single peaked preferences + Pairwise majority voting =
Condorcet Winner!!
2
Draw dynamic voting chart. What does a node represent?
Each node represents simultaneous voting in dynamic voting
3
When will the median have a majority preference over all alternatives in MVT (multi-dimensional)?
When there is a unique median in all dimensions of the policy spectrum.
4
What is the significance of having single-peaked preferences in the Median Voter Theorem?
It allows for the identification of the most preferred option by each individual.
5
How can the Median Voter Theorem be generalised (relaxing assumptions)?
When:
- N is an even number
- Strategic voting instead of sincere voting (in non-dynamic voting)
- No open agenda (lose stable equilibirum)
- Multideimensional policy platforms
- Single-peaked policy preferences (allowing for intermediate preferences or single-crossing preferences)
- N is an even number
- Strategic voting instead of sincere voting (in non-dynamic voting)
- No open agenda (lose stable equilibirum)
- Multideimensional policy platforms
- Single-peaked policy preferences (allowing for intermediate preferences or single-crossing preferences)
6
What is strategic voting?
When individuals may vote for the outcome they do not prefer, anticipating the consequences of their choice because they know the preference of other individuals
7
What is a weakly-dominant strategy in the context of the Median Voter Theorem?
A strategy that never provides a lower payoff than another strategy.
8
How does the presence of political parties affect the equilibrium in the Median Voter Theorem?
It replaces the open agenda and introduces policy alternatives.
9
What is the role of multidimensional policy platforms in the Median Voter Theorem
They expand the scope of policy preferences beyond a single dimension.
10
What happens when N=2 in the Median Voter Theorem?
The median voter is still in the middle of the distribution of bliss points.
11
How does strategic voting impact the outcomes in the Median Voter Theorem?
Individuals may vote strategically based on the preferences of others to achieve a higher payoff (instead of sincere voting).
12
Why is sincere voting considered a weakly-dominant strategy in the Median Voter Theorem?
It ensures a higher payoff compared to other strategies in most cases.
13
What is the outcome of strategic voting in a non-dynamic voting scenario in the Median Voter Theorem?
There is a unique weakly-dominant equilibrium where the Condorcet winner is chosen.
14
How does dynamic voting differ from non-dynamic voting in the Median Voter Theorem?
Sincere voting is not guaranteed to be a weakly dominant strategy in dynamic voting scenarios.
15
When N=3...
p$_m$ is uniquely defined by at least one voter
16
What's the outcome if, under open agenda, there are three policy alternatives a, b, c
- If they vote simultaneously without knowing the preferences of other people, every individual votes sincerely
- If they know the preferences of others, they can be strategic to enjoy a higher individual pay-off
- In a non-dynamic voting, sincere voting is still a weakly dominant strategy and there is a Condorcet winner
- In dynamic voting, sincere voting is not guaranteed to be a weakly dominant strategy
- If they know the preferences of others, they can be strategic to enjoy a higher individual pay-off
- In a non-dynamic voting, sincere voting is still a weakly dominant strategy and there is a Condorcet winner
- In dynamic voting, sincere voting is not guaranteed to be a weakly dominant strategy