1model 1
rational actor (this is what we've been using)
2model 2
routines and SOPs -> Ultimately decisions are made by organizations, Sometimes during crisis bureaucracies resort to what they do best which results in blunders, Foreign policy as output of SOPs rather than conscious decision
3model 3
bargaining among officials -> Constant tug of war between different bureaucracies which leads to none of them ultimately getting their most ideal outcome, Policy as political outcome (outcome of bargaining)
4model critique
krashner claims this is dangerous outlook because it underestimates president’s power, Ex. many bureaucratic actors have loyalties to the president, The president picks cabinet, Often only drive policy when president is not paying attention
5cult of the offensive
van evera, belief that offense is dominant and led to WW1 -> rigid SOPs and bureaucratic interests
6rigid SOPs
Offense dominance meant that you had to mobilize as quickly as possible and could not risk partial mobilization
7bureaucratic interests
militaries prefer offensive doctrines -> threat inflation, Organizations not always neutral, play part in defining the problem, Blocking out lessons: militaries thus fail to learn from previous mistakes because that is inconvenient to their offense dominant world
8adoption capacity theory
horowitz, factors: financial intensity & organizational capital