1What is the solution to the Condorcet paradox?
Imposing single-peaked preferences in pairwise majority voting
2Which fundamental of the social rule is abandoned in the Condorcet paradox?
Universal Domain
3What constitutes a 'good' social rule?
Rational, Paretian, Nondictatorial, Based on Universal Domain, Irrelevance of Independent Alternative
4What is the Condorcet winner?
The unique winner that emerges in pairwise comparisons when individual preferences are single-peaked
5What is the purpose of using an electoral/social decision rule (F) to aggregate individual preferences?
to lead to a single social preference relation/
6What did Arrow's Impossibility Theorem reveal about social decision rules?
It is impossible to obtain a rule that doesn’t violate independence of irrelevant alternatives - choice between A and B should not depend on the quality of a third, unrelated outcome C
7What does the Condorcet paradox illustrate?
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem
8What is sincere voting?
voting for one's most preferred preference
9What is an open agenda in direct democracy?
The agenda is not predetermined and can include any topic
10Can an individual with multi-peaked preferences be considered rational?
Not in terms of pairwise majority voting
11What is the goal of a social decision rule?
To obtain a single social preference relation.
12What is Arrow's Impossibility Theorem?
Any method of aggregating preferences must violate one of the specified properties of a 'good' social rule
13How can preferences be aggregated without violating Arrow's Impossibility Theorem?
By demanding more information on individual preferences or dropping/weakening some properties (UD or IIA)
14Does a society where everyone is rational always make rational decisions as a group?
It is uncertain if the group always decides rationally.
15What is the Condorcet paradox?
the failure of majority rule to produce transitive preferences for society
16Are individuals rational in the Condorcet paradox?
Individual rationality may not guarantee rational group decisions.
Single peaked preferences (linear order and 1 local maximum) and pairwise majority voting are the only way to ensure a rational group.