International Relations: Elites and Regime Types

Control over resource allocation (bureaucratic, monetary), domain specific expertise, gives cues to other elites/public

(gender, race, age, etc.) Influence how people are perceived which influences how they behave, ex. women i foreign policy

elite education, Ex. feeder schools into policy, econ/IMF work

people think elites are built different because of their expertise, Causes problems because study of political psychology relies on studying non-ellites; if they are so different that research is useless (can’t transfer info from non-elites to elites)

who’s in professional network which can vary based on party

nonpersonalist (elite-constrained), civilian audience, -> most constrained

nonpersonalist, military audience -> moderately war-prone cause audience sees use in force

personalist (unconstrianed leader), no audience, most war prone

saunders, Doves want a more restrained foreign policy (typically democrats), hawks want a more escalatory one (typically GOP)

selection pressure, agenda costs, buying off counter-types

dovish leaders face credibility problems on foreign policy leading to selecting hawkish advisors (ie. a democratic president choosing a hawkish (republican) secretary of state)

dovish leaders tend to come from democratic party which has more expansive domestic agenda (ie. healthcare, social welfare), Thus hawkish elites can threaten to impose agenda costs because doves need more out of legislature

Dovish elites get private benefits (career progression, support for their policy agenda) from reluctantly supporting hawkish positions, so they’re easier to co-opt; hawkish elites get few private benefits from supporting dovish positions.

once a conflict starts, doveish leaders face pressure from hawkish leaders to do enough to avoid losing

hawkish leaders face fewer constraints, less scrutiny, and easier cooptation of skeptics