1Who was the South Vietnamese leader described as “bottom of the barrel”?
Nguyen Cao Ky
2Who became the new South Vietnamese leader in late summer 1967?
Nguyen Van Thieu (“Two”)
3Why did Washington hope Thieu would be successful?
They hoped he would bring stability and effective leadership
4Did Thieu become the “answer to our prayers”?
No, but he wasn’t as bad as Ky
5Why were Americans struggling to distinguish friend from foe in 1967?
Because thousands of Viet Cong infiltrated South Vietnam wearing civilian clothes
6What did one U.S. officer say they needed to identify Viet Cong?
“Some sort of litmus test”
7How did many South Vietnamese perceive American culture?
Reprehensible, vulgar, and dishonorable
8Why did Americans restrict South Vietnamese access to U.S. bases?
Chronic security leaks and fear of VC infiltration
9Why did Americans stop sharing intel with the ARVN?
Fear the ARVN officer corps was infiltrated by the Viet Cong
10How did increased U.S. involvement affect ARVN motivation?
The more Americans fought, the less ARVN initiative there was
11How did many South Vietnamese begin viewing Americans by 1967?
As new imperialist occupiers
12What did Westmoreland request in summer 1967?
200,000 additional U.S. troops
13What strategy did he claim was working?
Search and destroy
14What bombing escalation did he advocate?
Intensifying bombing around Hanoi and Haiphong
15Why did LBJ’s speechwriter Bill Moyers resign?
He could no longer write speeches claiming the U.S. was winning the war
16Why did Undersecretary of State George Ball resign?
He had long opposed escalation and believed the war strategy was failing
17When had McNamara privately concluded the war was unwinnable?
As early as summer 1965
18What did McNamara privately recommend to Johnson?
An unconditional halt to the bombing
19Why did McNamara support halting the bombing?
To jump-start peace talks and reduce anti-war criticism
20What alternative to search-and-destroy did McNamara suggest?
A defensive strategy focused on protecting major urban areas
21Why was McNamara worried about continuing escalation?
Rising U.S. casualties
22When did McNamara resign?
November 1967
23How did LBJ respond to Westmoreland’s troop request?
He rejected 200,000 and approved only about 55,000
24Did Johnson change military strategy after these resignations?
No, he rejected halting the bombing and kept search and destroy
25What was Operation CHAOS?
A CIA surveillance program targeting anti-war leaders
26What did LBJ believe about the anti-war movement?
That it was much larger and more dangerous than it actually was
27How many dossiers were created under Operation CHAOS?
About 7,000
28What was Johnson trying to prove with Operation CHAOS?
That anti-war leaders were communist-influenced or directed
29What did Johnson order the military and diplomats to present?
Evidence of progress in Vietnam
30What statistic was emphasized in PR?
Higher enemy body counts and retaken villages
31Why did Westmoreland return to the U.S. in late 1967?
To conduct a national PR tour
32What did Westmoreland claim in his National Press Club speech?
That the war’s end was “coming into view”
33What did he call the upcoming new stage of the war?
Phase Three
34What would Phase Three focus on?
Strengthening ARVN, improving government, economy, infrastructure, and continuing pressure on the North
35What did Westmoreland say Phase Four would bring?
Stability, collapsing communist infrastructure, and U.S. troop withdrawals
36What phrase summarized his message?
“Light at the end of the tunnel”
37Who were the “Wise Men”?
Johnson’s trusted civilian advisers
38What did the Wise Men tell LBJ in December 1967?
That spying on Americans was wrong, search and destroy wasn’t working, and Westmoreland’s optimism was false
39What did they warn would happen if LBJ tried to shift fighting to ARVN?
South Vietnam would collapse and LBJ would pay the political price
40What did U.S. intelligence find in late October 1967?
10,000–12,000 NVA troops near Dak To close to the Ho Chi Minh Trail
41How many U.S. troops were ultimately sent to Dak To?
About 16,000
42What type of mission was Dak To?
A massive search-and-destroy operation
43What difficult terrain characterized Dak To?
Rugged, mountainous Central Highlands
44What hill became the focus of the Battle of Dak To?
Hill 875
45Why was it called Hill 875?
Its elevation (875 meters)
46How many NVA were believed to be dug in on the hill?
Around 2,000
47How had the NVA fortified Hill 875?
Perimeter trenches and deep tunnel complexes
48How long did U.S. forces take to reach the top?
Five days
49What happened after the U.S. captured the hill?
They declared victory and withdrew
50What was the U.S. casualty count at Dak To?
About 850 wounded, ~200 killed
51How many NVA casualties were estimated?
Around 3,600
52Why was Dak To a trap?
The NVA tested whether the U.S. would relocate massive forces into remote areas
53What did the U.S. do after “winning”?
Withdrew, allowing NVA units to return immediately
54What did this show about U.S. strategy?
It focused on body count, not holding territory
55What major campaign had the North Vietnamese been planning?
The Tet Offensive
56Who planned the Tet Offensive?
General Giap and Communist Party leader Le Duan
57When did infiltration for Tet begin?
Early January 1968
58How could the Viet Cong infiltrate cities undetected?
They wore civilian clothes and blended with holiday travelers
59Why was Tet chosen for the attack?
A holiday ceasefire made U.S. and ARVN forces less alert
60Who was the longtime U.S. Embassy driver involved in the Tet attack?
Sau Chmo (“Satchmo”), real name Dinh
61How long had he worked for the embassy?
Since 1950
62When did the attack on the U.S. Embassy occur?
2:45 a.m., January 31, 1968
63How many Viet Cong commandos attacked the Embassy?
19
64What breach allowed them inside?
A three-foot hole blown in the outer wall
65What was discovered after the battle?
All 19 attackers were dead; Satchmo was among them armed with a pistol, AK-47, and money
66Why was his participation shocking?
He was one of the embassy’s most trusted workers
67What was the strategic goal of the Tet Offensive?
To lure U.S. troops away, infiltrate cities, trigger uprisings, and collapse the South Vietnamese government
68What attacks before Tet tested U.S. responses?
Kontum/Khe Sanh attacks and the Dak To fighting
69Where is Khe Sanh located?
Near the Laotian border, close to the Ho Chi Minh Trail
70Who were the Montagnard?
Rural indigenous South Vietnamese trained by U.S. Special Forces
71Why were Montagnards looked down upon?
Because they were agrarian, darker-skinned, and viewed as low status
72Why did LBJ insist on holding Khe Sanh?
He became obsessed with defending it “at any cost”
73What did reinforcing Khe Sanh require?
Expanding the airfield and sending thousands of troops
74How did focusing on Khe Sanh help the enemy?
It diverted U.S. attention from the nationwide Tet buildup
75What was the significance of Tet?
It became the turning point of the Vietnam War
76What political pressure was Lyndon Johnson facing in late 1967 going into 1968?
He needed to show progress in Vietnam before the November 1968 election.
77What did Westmoreland continue forecasting to the American public before Tet?
He insisted the U.S. was making progress and moving into “phase three, phase four” toward victory.
78What was the significance of the Battle of Dak To (called “Battle of October” in lecture)?
It tested whether the U.S. would move large numbers of troops into isolated terrain, which they did with about 16,000 men.
79What was the overall North Vietnamese plan for the Tet Offensive?
Use diversionary attacks to pull U.S. troops from cities, trigger a mass uprising in South Vietnam, topple the Thieu government, and force U.S. negotiation.
80Why would U.S. airpower be limited during the Tet plan?
The U.S. avoided heavy bombing inside South Vietnamese cities to prevent massive civilian casualties.
81Why were Con Thien and Khe Sanh important U.S. positions before Tet?
Con Thien protected the DMZ border, and Khe Sanh guarded the Ho Chi Minh Trail corridor near Laos.
82How personally invested was Johnson in Khe Sanh?
He kept a physical model of the Khe Sanh area in the White House and ordered over 6,000 Marines to hold it at all costs.
83What geographic disadvantage did Khe Sanh suffer from?
The base sat below higher surrounding hills controlled by North Vietnamese forces who used them for heavy artillery and mortar attacks.
84How widespread were Tet Offensive attacks across South Vietnam?
Five of the six largest cities and 36 of 44 provincial capitals were attacked, including Westmoreland’s headquarters and the U.S. Embassy.
85What U.S. analogy did the professor give to show the scale of Tet?
A single weekend in which major U.S. cities like Boston, New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, and ~40 state capitals were attacked simultaneously.
86Who carried out most Tet attacks in cities and towns?
Between 80,000 and 85,000 Viet Cong fighters.
87Which key city was attacked mainly by the North Vietnamese Army rather than the Viet Cong?
Huế, the ancient capital of Vietnam.
88Where were most Viet Cong forces located prior to Tet?
In rural regions—western border areas, the Central Highlands, and the Mekong Delta.
89What was the military outcome of every major Tet battle?
The enemy lost every battle and failed to maintain control of any location.
90Why did the Tet Offensive fail militarily for the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong?
Their forces were too widely dispersed to concentrate strength, making coordinated victory impossible.
91How long did the Battle of Huế last?
A little over three weeks, until around February 24–25, 1968.
92What kind of combat characterized the Battle of Huế?
Intense house-to-house fighting with heavy bombing and artillery.
93What was meant by the statement “we had to destroy the city to save the city”?
Retaking Huế required such heavy destruction that the city was devastated in the process.
94What civilian atrocities occurred during the Battle of Huế?
As they retreated, enemy forces massacred an estimated up to 3,000 civilians and created mass graves.
95How many South Vietnamese civilians were displaced by the Huế battle?
Over 100,000 became refugees.
96How devastating was Tet for Viet Cong forces numerically?
Around 70–80% of the 80–85,000 Viet Cong involved were killed or wounded.
97What was General Giáp’s intention regarding city control during Tet?
He hoped capturing cities would trigger urban uprisings and collapse the Thieu government.
98What realization did Tet bring to both South Vietnamese and Americans?
That the war was nowhere near ending, despite years of promises of imminent victory.
99What is the “credibility gap” mentioned in the lecture?
The growing difference between what U.S. leaders claimed and what the American public saw happening in Vietnam.
100How did Khe Sanh differ in duration from most Tet battles?
Most Tet attacks lasted a day or two, but the Khe Sanh siege continued until early June 1968.
101Why did resupplying Khe Sanh become extremely difficult?
North Vietnamese artillery destroyed the airstrip, forcing U.S. planes to slow-fly and push supplies out with parachutes.
102Why did abandoning Khe Sanh deepen the credibility gap?
The U.S. fought desperately to hold it but evacuated it within weeks of the battle ending.
103How much of U.S. nightly news covered Tet in early 1968?
About 90% of the three major networks’ broadcasts.
104Approximately how many Americans watched the evening news during Tet?
Around 60 million.
105What famous war image emerged during Tet involving a Viet Cong prisoner?
The execution photo of a handcuffed Viet Cong guerrilla shot by South Vietnam’s police chief Nguyễn Ngọc Loan.
106Who captured the execution photograph?
Eddie Adams of the Associated Press.
107Why did the execution photo shock Americans?
It showed a public, non-trial killing by a South Vietnamese official, broadcast without censorship.
108How did Westmoreland describe Tet in messages to Washington?
As the enemy’s “last gasp” that the U.S. had survived and defeated.
109What strategic shift began after Tet?
The U.S. moved from “search and destroy” operations to “population security,” focusing on defending cities.
110Why was the shift to population security also political?
Defensive strategy meant fewer casualties, which could reduce anti-war sentiment in the U.S.
111What new burden did the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) assume under the new strategy?
They were expected to conduct most offensive operations.
112Who became Secretary of Defense after McNamara resigned?
Clark Clifford.
113Why did Clifford oppose Westmoreland?
Westmoreland wanted escalation and more troops; Clifford wanted de-escalation and strategic withdrawal.
114What did Walter Cronkite do after Tet that influenced public opinion?
He traveled to Vietnam himself and produced a televised special concluding the war was a “stalemate” requiring negotiation.
115What famous line did LBJ say after watching Cronkite’s report?
“If I’ve lost Cronkite, I’ve lost Middle America.”
116How did the House of Representatives react politically after Tet?
139 members sponsored a resolution demanding a full review of U.S. Vietnam policy.
117What was Johnson’s approval rating after Tet?
It fell to 26%.
118Who first challenged LBJ for the Democratic nomination in 1968?
Senator Eugene McCarthy of Minnesota.
119How well did McCarthy do in the New Hampshire primary?
He lost but received 42% of the vote, shocking Johnson.
120Who entered the 1968 race after McCarthy’s strong showing?
Robert F. Kennedy.
121What financial crisis did Johnson face in March 1968?
His Treasury Secretary warned that major tax increases were required to fund both the Great Society and the war.
122How many additional troops did Westmoreland request after Tet?
206,000 more troops.
123Why did this request worsen Johnson’s situation?
Sending them would require even larger tax increases or cuts to domestic programs.
124What did Johnson ultimately decide about Westmoreland’s request?
He refused to send the 206,000 additional troops.
125What happened to Westmoreland after Johnson rejected his request?
He was reassigned (promoted) to Army Chief of Staff and replaced in Vietnam.
126What did Johnson hope to achieve through his March 31, 1968 speech?
To explain the new direction of U.S. strategy and present a path toward peace negotiations.
127What dramatic announcement did Johnson make at the end of the speech?
“I shall not seek and I will not accept the nomination of my party for another term as your President.”
128What shift in war policy did Johnson outline in that speech?
Partial bombing halt, transfer of more fighting to South Vietnam, and pursuit of negotiations with North Vietnam.
129What major point Johnson emphasized in his March 31, 1968 speech regarding Vietnam?
He announced a halt to the bombing of North Vietnam and expressed willingness to pursue peace negotiations.
130How many Americans had been killed in Vietnam by March 31, 1968?
Over 21,000 Americans had been killed in action by that date.
131How many total names are on the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Wall?
Over 58,000 names are on the Wall.
132How soon after Johnson’s speech did Hanoi announce willingness to negotiate?
Three days after the speech, Hanoi said they were open to negotiations.
133When did formal peace talks in Paris begin?
Formal talks began on May 13, 1968.
134Why did North Vietnam drag out the Paris negotiations?
They believed Johnson, now a lame duck, would become desperate and offer more concessions if talks were delayed.
135What major contradiction existed in Johnson’s bombing halt?
He halted bombing in North Vietnam but escalated bombing in South Vietnam, dropping over one million tons of bombs in 1968.
136Why were South Vietnamese leaders frustrated during peace talks?
They felt excluded because negotiations were mainly between Washington and Hanoi, even though it was their land and future at stake.
137What tension persisted among American troops in South Vietnam?
Difficulty identifying the enemy, since Viet Cong looked indistinguishable from friendly South Vietnamese civilians.
138Why did U.S. intelligence target the village of My Lai?
They believed My Lai was infiltrated by Viet Cong sympathizers and ordered it to be “neutralized.”
139Who commanded Charlie Company at My Lai?
Lieutenant William Calley commanded Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment.
140What happened when Charlie Company entered My Lai?
They fired on anything in sight, killing civilians, livestock, women, and children.
141How many civilians were killed at My Lai?
Over 500 civilians were killed.
142What did some soldiers of Charlie Company refuse to do?
Some refused to fire on unarmed civilians because it violated their moral conscience.
143Who intervened to stop further killings at My Lai?
Helicopter pilot Hugh Thompson landed between villagers and soldiers and threatened to fire on Charlie Company if they continued shooting civilians.
144How many deaths did Calley falsely report in his after-action report?
He reported 128 deaths instead of the actual ~500.
145How many weapons were allegedly found in My Lai?
Only three rifles were recovered.
146How long was the My Lai massacre covered up by the U.S. Army?
It was covered up for over a year and a half, until November 1969.
147Which reporter uncovered the My Lai cover-up?
Seymour Hersh exposed the massacre and published interviews and articles.
148What photographer documented the massacre?
Army photographer Ron Haeberle photographed the massacre, using his personal color camera to avoid Army control.
149What happened to Lieutenant Calley after My Lai?
He was convicted of premeditated murder, sentenced to life, reduced to 20 years, and released after 10.
150What other national tragedies occurred in spring and summer 1968?
Martin Luther King Jr. was assassinated April 4, 1968, and Robert F. Kennedy was assassinated in June 1968.
151Where did national unrest become visible during the 1968 Democratic Convention?
Chicago saw mass protests involving antiwar, civil rights, women’s rights, and environmental activists.
152How did Chicago Mayor Richard Daley respond to the 1968 protests?
He mobilized over 25,000 police and National Guard troops to maintain order.
153Why did the Chicago protests overshadow the Democratic nomination?
Television coverage focused on violent clashes in the streets instead of events inside the convention hall.
154Why were young Democrats upset about Hubert Humphrey’s nomination?
They felt he was simply an extension of Johnson and lacked the fresh energy Robert Kennedy represented.
155What was Richard Nixon’s campaign message on Vietnam?
He claimed to have a “secret plan” to end the war but would not reveal it because “then it wouldn’t be a secret.”
156Who was Anna Chennault and why was she important?
She was a Republican liaison who communicated with South Vietnam’s President Thieu and urged him to sabotage late-stage peace efforts to help Nixon.
157What did Johnson announce on October 31, 1968?
He announced an unconditional halt to all bombing in Vietnam, North and South.
158Who won the 1968 presidential election?
Richard Nixon won with 301 electoral votes.
159Who was the third-party candidate who carried several Southern states in 1968?
George Wallace, former Alabama governor who opposed civil rights reforms.
160Why did Johnson’s advisors push him to compromise late in 1968?
They believed his legacy depended on restarting negotiations and possibly beginning U.S. troop withdrawals.
161What absurd issue stalled peace negotiations in late 1968 and early 1969?
A prolonged debate over the shape of the negotiating table—rectangular, square, round, or combined.
162What table arrangement was ultimately adopted?
One round table in the center with two square tables on either side for the delegations.
163How many Americans were killed in action in 1968?
Over 14,500 Americans were killed in 1968.
164How many total Americans had been killed by the end of 1968?
Over 30,000 Americans had been killed in action by the end of the year.
165What did Henry Kissinger say about Vietnam strategy in early 1969?
“We will not make the same old mistakes in Vietnam. We will make our own.”
166What did Nixon claim in his first major press conference in 1969?
He said he believed the war could be ended in six months.
167What central goal did Nixon pursue in Vietnam?
He sought an independent, non-communist South Vietnam while reducing U.S. troop presence.
168What troop level existed in Vietnam by April 1969?
Over 540,000 U.S. troops were deployed in South Vietnam.
169What strategy required transferring fighting to South Vietnamese forces?
Drawing down U.S. troops while shifting combat responsibility to the ARVN.
170What did Nixon believe must happen for ARVN to succeed?
Enemy infiltration from the Ho Chi Minh Trail had to be stopped to prevent resupply of North Vietnamese troops.
171What was Operation Apache Snow?
A 1969 operation targeting the A Shau Valley to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
172What hill became the focus of Operation Apache Snow?
Hill 937, later known as Hamburger Hill.
173How many U.S. troops initially attempted to seize Hamburger Hill?
About 400 members of the 101st Airborne Division.
174Why was Hamburger Hill so difficult to capture?
North Vietnamese forces were deeply entrenched with fortified bunkers across the hillside.
175How many assaults did U.S. troops make on Hamburger Hill?
Ten separate assaults over ten days.
176How many U.S. casualties occurred at Hamburger Hill?
About 450 casualties, including nearly 100 killed.
177How many airstrikes and bombs supported the assault?
Over 250 airstrikes and more than 500 tons of bombs were dropped on the hill.
178What happened two weeks after capturing Hamburger Hill?
U.S. forces abandoned it, and the NVA reoccupied it without resistance.
179How did Americans react to the abandonment of Hamburger Hill?
They were outraged and confused, seeing it as senseless loss of life for no meaningful gain.
180What magazine intensified public anger after Hamburger Hill?
Life magazine published photos of 242 Americans killed in one week of fighting.
181What did polls show by June 1969?
Support for the war fell below 40% for the first time.
182How did Nixon respond to declining poll numbers?
He escalated bombing against North Vietnam, including strikes in Hanoi and Haiphong.
183Which countries became targets despite being “neutral”?
Cambodia and Laos were bombed to hit North Vietnamese sanctuaries.
184How did news of bombing in neutral countries become public?
A New York Times reporter revealed the secret bombings.
185What was Nixon’s response to the leak of the bombing?
He ordered wiretaps on government employees suspected of leaking information.
186What group formed to stop leaks from the White House?
The “plumbers,” whose creation later tied into Watergate.
187What was Operation Duck Hook?
A covert strategy to deliver massive blows against North Vietnam—potentially even nuclear weapons.
188Who convened the top-secret study group that produced Duck Hook?
Richard Nixon told Henry Kissinger to convene it.
189What was the central purpose of Operation Duck Hook?
To plan a savage, punishing blow against North Vietnam.
190What targets did Duck Hook consider bombing?
The Ho Chi Minh Trail in Cambodia and major North Vietnamese cities like Hanoi and Haiphong.
191What extreme option was included in Duck Hook’s planning?
The potential use of tactical nuclear weapons.
192What major event occurred while Duck Hook was being debated?
News arrived that Ho Chi Minh had died on September 2, 1969.
193Who was effectively running North Vietnam after the Tet Offensive?
Lê Duẩn was running the government while Ho Chi Minh was a symbolic leader.
194What domestic movement was sparked by news of Ho Chi Minh’s death?
A mass grassroots protest movement demanding an end to the war.
195What was the national protest on October 15, 1969 called?
The Moratorium to End the War.
196How many people marched in Washington, D.C. during the Moratorium?
Over a quarter of a million protesters.
197Who led the Washington D.C. march during the Moratorium?
Coretta Scott King.
198How did Nixon publicly respond to the Moratorium protesters?
He called them anarchists and communist sympathizers.
199What significant speech did Nixon deliver on November 3, 1969?
His Vietnamization speech.
200What did Nixon say caused national division over Vietnam?
A “credibility gap” between government statements and actual facts.
201How did Nixon frame the situation he inherited from LBJ?
He emphasized casualties, troop numbers, stalled negotiations, and blamed LBJ for the crisis.
202Why did Nixon reject immediate withdrawal from Vietnam?
He argued it would betray allies and damage America’s global credibility.
203What core policy did Nixon announce to shift responsibility to South Vietnam?
Vietnamization.
204Under Vietnamization, what role would South Vietnam assume?
Primary responsibility for ground fighting (manpower).
205What military support did the U.S. say it would continue providing during Vietnamization?
Air support, economic assistance, and military aid.
206What shocking news did Nixon reveal to the South Vietnamese through his speech?
That the U.S. intended a complete withdrawal of combat forces in the future.
207Why did Nixon refuse to disclose a timetable for troop withdrawal?
He said the enemy would simply wait them out.
208What phrase did Nixon use to rally Americans in support of his policy?
The “great silent majority.”
209Why was Nixon’s Vietnamization speech well-received by the public?
He announced that 60,000 troops would be withdrawn by the end of the year.
210What shift in media coverage occurred after the Vietnamization speech?
Pro-Nixon patriotic rallies began to replace anti-war protest coverage.
211What did media reports highlight about Mrs. Nixon’s visit to College of the Ozarks?
That the campus was patriotic and free of anti-war protests.
212Who took over command in Vietnam after Westmoreland?
General Creighton Abrams.
213How did Abrams change U.S. military strategy?
Shifted from search-and-destroy to targeting enemy logistics and the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
214Why did Nixon believe the war could not end without action in Cambodia?
Because the Ho Chi Minh Trail continued sending men and supplies into South Vietnam.
215What happened to Cambodia’s leader Prince Sihanouk in 1970?
He was overthrown in a CIA-involved coup and replaced by Lon Nol.
216Why did the U.S. support Lon Nol’s rise to power?
He would not fiercely object to U.S. operations against the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
217What were the two main Cambodian target regions during the invasion?
The Parrot’s Beak and the Fishhook.
218Who conducted the ground assault into Cambodia?
ARVN forces, with U.S. air support.
219How far did the U.S. and ARVN plan to push into Cambodia?
About thirty miles.
220When did Nixon announce the Cambodia operation to the American people?
April 30, 1970.
221What key fact did Nixon not disclose in his Cambodia speech?
The attacks were beginning only about an hour and a half after the speech.
222How did Nixon justify the Cambodia incursion?
He said it was needed to protect U.S. troops and ensure Vietnamization succeeded.
223What term did Nixon use instead of “invasion” when describing Cambodia?
“Incursion.”
224What did Nixon claim the U.S. would do after defeating enemy forces in Cambodia?
Withdraw and not occupy the territory.
225What domestic reaction followed the Cambodia incursion?
A massive reignition of the anti-war movement.
226How many college campuses saw protests in spring 1970?
Over 450 campuses.
227On which campus did the most infamous protest occur?
Kent State University in Ohio.
228What triggered the presence of the Ohio National Guard at Kent State?
Administrators feared unrest and asked the governor for support.
229How were the Guardsmen equipped at Kent State?
With live ammunition and little crowd-control training.
230What occurred at Kent State on May 4, 1970?
Guardsmen fired ~70 rounds in 15 seconds, killing four students and wounding others.
231How many of the students killed at Kent State were not protesting?
Two students were simply walking to class.
232Which other universities also saw violent confrontations in 1970?
University at Buffalo and Jackson State University.
233What drastic action did the University of Kentucky take after protest violence?
Shut down campus and ordered all students off campus within 24 hours.
234How did Congress react to the Cambodia incursion?
The Senate voted to terminate the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.
235What bipartisan proposal arose in 1970 regarding troop levels?
A plan calling for complete U.S. withdrawal by the end of 1971.
236How did Nixon respond to congressional attempts to limit his power?
With disdain and the creation of the Houston Plan.
237What was the purpose of the Houston Plan?
To authorize CIA, FBI, and NSA surveillance, mail-opening, and burglaries against suspected “enemies.”
238Whom did Nixon label as “mad men” and “rabble”?
Congressmen seeking oversight, the media, and anti-war protestors.
239How far into Cambodia did U.S./ARVN forces actually advance before withdrawal?
About 27 miles—three miles short of their target.
240Why did troops see the halted invasion as frustrating?
It resembled earlier political decisions where gains were abandoned.
241What supplies were seized or destroyed during the Cambodia operation?
20,000 weapons, 2,000 tons of ammunition, and 700 tons of rice.
242What casualty numbers resulted from the Cambodia incursion?
About 1,100 U.S./ARVN troops killed and roughly 14,000 enemy killed.
243What was the political consequence of the Cambodia invasion on the home front?
Deeper national division and rising fear that Nixon might be a one-term president.
244Why did North Vietnam and the Viet Cong walk out of the Paris peace talks after the Cambodia invasion?
Because they demanded that the U.S. fully withdraw from Cambodia before any talks resumed and used U.S. domestic backlash to pressure Nixon.
245What was Vietnamization supposed to achieve according to Nixon?
Turning the ground war over to ARVN while the U.S. shifted to mainly air support.
246Why did increased U.S. air missions in 1970 raise risks for Americans?
More missions meant more pilots were being shot down and captured as POWs.
247What was Operation Ivory Coast designed to do?
Rescue 50–55 American POWs believed to be held at the Sơn Tây camp.
248Why did the Sơn Tây raid fail to free any POWs?
Because the POWs had been moved before the raid.
249Why was the Sơn Tây raid still considered a strategic success?
It forced North Vietnam to consolidate POWs into central prisons, boosting POW morale and limiting vulnerability to future raids.
250How did North Vietnam use POWs in negotiations?
As major bargaining chips, knowing the U.S. could not secure peace without recovering them.
251What effect did propaganda filming have on POWs like Norm McDaniel?
They were temporarily given clean clothes and food for staged photos, which were reclaimed immediately afterward.
252Why did Nixon feel pressured in early 1971 despite Vietnamization?
His reelection campaign was approaching, and he needed visible progress in the war.
253What was the goal of Operation Lam Son 719?
To invade Laos and disrupt the northern section of the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
254Why did the U.S. retake Khe Sanh for Lam Son 719?
To use its airstrip as a base for supporting ARVN’s advance along Highway 9.
255Why was Highway 9 crucial in Lam Son 719?
It was the only major road wide enough for military equipment and led directly to Tchepone.
256Why did ARVN’s advance stall halfway to Tchepone?
They were stopped by 20,000–40,000 NVA troops massed at the Laotian border.
257Why did helicopter insertions at LZs Sophia, Liz, and Lola go badly?
Hueys took heavy fire, seven were shot down, rescue circling exposed more aircraft, and some helicopters never deployed their ARVN troops.
258What allowed ARVN to eventually reach Tchepone?
Intense U.S. bombing runs that cleared Highway 9.
259Why was reaching Tchepone not a real victory for ARVN?
The NVA had removed all supplies before withdrawing, leaving the town empty.
260How did the NVA respond during ARVN’s withdrawal from Laos?
They launched constant daily attacks, turning the withdrawal into a near-rout.
261Why did the U.S. claim Lam Son 719 proved Vietnamization worked?
Because ARVN inflicted roughly three times as many casualties as they suffered, despite needing U.S. air support.
262Why did U.S. public support drop below 30% by spring 1971?
Despite troop withdrawals, the public viewed the war as a continuing failure and grew war-weary.
263Why were Vietnam Veterans Against the War significant?
Their participation—combat veterans protesting in uniform—gave the antiwar movement new credibility.
264What were key points in John Kerry’s 1971 testimony to the Senate?
That the U.S. had no direct interest in South Vietnam, the war was corrupt and immoral, statistics were falsified, and men were dying for a “mistake.”
265What was revealed during Lt. William Calley’s spring 1971 trial?
The full extent of the My Lai massacre and its cover-up.
266What were the Pentagon Papers?
Top secret documents leaked by Daniel Ellsberg showing JFK and LBJ had misled the public about the Vietnam War.
267Why did Nixon fight publication of the Pentagon Papers?
He feared leaks would expose his own covert abuses and political secrets.
268What was the Supreme Court’s ruling in New York Times v. United States (1971)?
A 6–3 decision allowing publication because the government failed to show grave, irreparable harm.
269Why did Nixon create the “plumbers”?
To “plug leaks” by discrediting critics and preventing further exposure of administration secrets.
270How did the Pentagon Papers lead toward Watergate?
Nixon’s paranoia about leaks escalated covert operations, eventually resulting in the Watergate break-in.
271What did the 1971 Gallup Poll reveal about public sentiment?
71% believed entering Vietnam was a mistake, 58% called the war immoral, and Nixon’s approval fell to 31%.
272Why did Nixon become desperate for a peace settlement by 1971?
He needed a diplomatic breakthrough to be reelected in 1972.
273What did Kissinger offer Le Duc Tho in 1971?
Release of all POWs in exchange for full U.S. troop withdrawal within seven months—but without requiring NVA withdrawal from South Vietnam.
274Why did South Vietnam oppose Kissinger’s proposal?
It allowed North Vietnamese troops to remain in South Vietnam, leaving ARVN vulnerable once the U.S. withdrew.
275What was Le Duc Tho’s counteroffer?
POWs would be released only after all U.S. forces withdrew and all U.S. aid to the Thieu government ended.
276Why did Kissinger reject Le Duc Tho’s counteroffer?
It abandoned South Vietnam and guaranteed rapid collapse, violating Nixon’s demand for “peace with honor.”
277What shocking suggestion did Le Duc Tho make during negotiations?
He told Kissinger the U.S. could “solve its problems” by assassinating President Thieu.
278Why did North Vietnam launch the Easter Offensive in 1972?
They believed domestic U.S. political pressure would prevent Nixon from deploying more American troops.
279Where were the three main attack points of the Easter Offensive?
Across the DMZ near Dong Ha, in the Central Highlands (Kontum/Pleiku), and west of Saigon.
280How did the Easter Offensive differ from the Tet Offensive?
It focused on three concentrated fronts and relied on regular NVA forces, not Viet Cong.
281What was Nixon’s military response to the Easter Offensive?
Massive B-52 strikes, attacks on the DMZ, and strikes around Hanoi and Haiphong.
282According to Nixon’s May 1972 speech, what were the U.S. response options?
Immediate withdrawal, continued negotiations, or decisive military action.
283Why did Nixon reject immediate withdrawal in 1972?
He argued it would abandon South Vietnam and encourage global communist aggression.
284What new measures did Nixon announce in his May 1972 address?
Mining North Vietnamese ports, cutting rail links from China, and continuing air and naval strikes.
285What conditions did Nixon give for ending U.S. escalation in May 1972?
Return of all American POWs and a ceasefire.
286How did Nixon frame his actions in the May 1972 address?
He claimed he was not expanding but ending the war, and that North Vietnam had escalated every time the U.S. proposed peace.
287What major force carried out the Easter Offensive in 1972?
The North Vietnamese Army (NVA), whose numbers were in the thousands rather than tens of thousands by that point.
288Where did the NVA launch their three main attacks during the Easter Offensive?
Across the DMZ including Dong Ha, into the Central Highlands including Kontum, and down through the Parrot’s Beak into the Mekong Delta.
289How did the United States initially react to the Easter Offensive?
They were surprised by the speed and magnitude of the invasion.
290What military response did Nixon authorize once the Easter Offensive began?
He approved B-52 strikes along the DMZ and expanded bombing to fuel depots near Hanoi and Haiphong.
291What previously restricted targets did Nixon authorize strikes against in 1972?
Fuel depots around Hanoi and Haiphong, the railroad links from China to North Vietnam, and the mining of Haiphong Harbor.
292What withdrawal timeline did Nixon announce in his televised address?
He said the U.S. would completely withdraw from Vietnam within four months once POWs were released and a cease-fire began.
293What was the original U.S. withdrawal timeline before Nixon shortened it to four months?
Seven months.
294What did Nixon tell Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird about his strategy?
“We must go for broke… punish the enemy and stop at nothing to bring him to his knees.”
295How did Nixon justify the possibility of civilian casualties?
He said he would approve bombing important targets “even if it risks civilian casualties,” though he denied targeting civilians indiscriminately.
296How did China and the Soviet Union respond to Nixon’s escalated bombing?
Both urged restraint, not wanting the war to escalate into a nuclear conflict.
297How did the American public react to Nixon’s bombing strategy?
They viewed bombing as more acceptable than sending more ground troops because it meant fewer U.S. casualties.
298Why did Nixon’s approval ratings rise in mid-1972?
His Easter Offensive response appeared forceful, and Democrats nominated the very liberal, antiwar Senator George McGovern.
299What was the codename for the U.S. bombing campaign responding to the Easter Offensive?
Operation Linebacker.
300How many tons of bombs were dropped on North Vietnam in June 1972 alone?
112,000 tons in that single month.