CivPro: Class 25-35

Granted: Hostile work environment, disparate treatment, deprivation
Denied: Pregnancy discrimination, interference, retaliation, constructive discharge

The judge opined that it was not enough for the plaintiff to show that her workplace was offensive. It had to be "so permeated" with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that a reasonable person would find it hostile and abusive.

The plaintiff's involuntary transfer from WANS to patrol.

Because there was an adverse employment action, and substantial evidence that the action was caused by discriminatory animus related to the plaintiff's pregnancy, raising a genuine question of fact that a reasonable jury could conclude on.

False, disagreement on the claim is a given. Only evidence, or lack thereof, can shows whether there is a genuine dispute of material fact.

True

That the right to a jury trial is preserved for suits at common law exceeding $20, and that no fact tried by a jury can be re-examined in any US court.

When people could not get justice in court, they sought relief at the Chancery, an English administrative department led by a Chancellor. The Chancellor's interventions appeared judicial, were case-specific, and were led by distinctly equitable principles.

The right to a jury trial is to be preserved by the Seventh Amendment or federal statute. A party may demand a jury trial by either serving a written demand, or including the demand in a pleading, within 14 days of a previous pleading's service.

Established that when a case includes both legal and equitable claims that share common facts, the legal claims must be tried by a jury first to protect the party's right to a jury trial, unless some emergency equitable relief requires immediate judicial action.

On the equitable claims, if a judge decided on facts first, there may be a collateral estoppel effect which would unconstitutionally prevent those facts from being heard by a jury. The right to a jury trial is to be preserved pursuant to the Seventh Amendment.

Established that whether a claim is legal or equitable for jury trial depends on 1) pre-merger customs, 2) type of relief sought, 3) practical ability of a jury. Here, a trademark owner sought equitable relief through an injunction and an "accounting", and DQ demanded a jury trial. SCOTUS rejected the district court's analysis that DQ's demand was incidental, and reaffirmed its holding in Beacon that equitable claims are only to be decided first in exceptional circumstances.

Denying jury consideration of issues that are seen as only incidental to equitable claims. This doctrine has been struck by SCOTUS (see Dairy Queen).

Established that judges, not juries, are to decide what the terms in a patent mean, so that they may properly instruct a jury, who decides on the factual issues they represent, including whether a defendant’s product infringes the patent.

True, however, a party can demand a jury trial against a federal government official

Judges, as held in Merck

Jury

Jury

US Citizenship; 18+

Full pool of prospective jurors; selected jury members of 6-12 people

Examination of prospective jurors

Each party is entittled to three peremptory challenges, and an unlimited amount of challenges for cause. The judge may excuse a juror for "good cause" at any time.

Juries must have at least 6 members, and no more than 12. Unless the parties stipulate otherwise, the verdict must be unanimous.

Juries are comprised of fellow citizens, not a judge. No one may be removed from the ability to serve on a jury based solely on their race or gender.

The Batson case, a criminal case decided one year before the civil Edmonson case.

Conflicts of interest, including familial and financial relationships

1. Denial of the right to a "jury of peers"
2. Violation of one's right to serve on a jury
3. Undermining the fairness of the civil justice system

Whether constitutional protections would extend to prospective jurors in a private civil suit between private parties.

Established that race-based exclusion violates constitutional equal protection rights of prospective jurors, because civil disputes are inherently state actions. SCOTUS mandated that courts must entertain challenges to a private litigant’s racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges.

Courts may determine their own procedures. They may consider counsel's prior history of race-based exclusion, or require a party to provide a non-discriminatory reason for their peremptory challenge. In response, the court may consider whether the party's proffered reason is pretextual.

1. Jury selection
2. Opening statements
3. Plaintiff's case-in-chief; plaintiff rests
4. Defendant may seek JMOL (Rule 50(a))
5. Defendant's case-in-chief; defendant rests
6. Plaintiff can seek rebuttal
7. Either party may seek JMOL (Rule 50(a))
8. Closing arguments
9. Jury instructions & case submitted
10. Verdict
11. Either party may seek Renewed JMOL (Rule 50(b)) and/or request a new trial (Rule 59)

After plaintiff rests their case-in-chief, and again after plaintiff's rebuttal to defendant's case-in-chief (if there is a rebuttal at all)

After defendant rests their case-in-chief, or after plaintiff's own rebuttal (if there's been one)

MSJ are pre-trial only, JMOL may only be raised during the trial phase

False, JMOL may target specific claims rather than an entire suit

False, while peremptory challenges made on the basis of race-based exclusion are unconstitutional, peremptory challenges themselves are not ensured under the constitution. Peremptory challenges are a longstanding tradition.

Directed verdict

The jury would either be denied an oppurtunity to render a verdict, or, if post-verdict, the judge would reverse.

The judge is to evaluate the sufficiency of evidence, not weigh the evidence itself or determine its credibility.

Established that courts are not to substitute their own judgment on the evidence presented when deciding JMOL. Here, the appeals court had improperly discredited the evidence of the plaintiff, and also failed to consider the full scope of the plaintiff's evidence. Plaintiff had no burden of persuasion, but rather a burden of production, which was met under the McDonell Douglas test.

When the non-moving party lacks substantial evidence such that no reasonable jury would find in their favor at trial.

The non-moving party. However, if the moving party presents evidence that directly contradicts the non-moving party's evidence on the record, then the court is not obligated to accept the non-moving party's version of events.

If a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial, and the opposing party moves for JMOL, the court may grant judgment in the moving party's favor if a reasonable jury would not have a "legally sufficient evidentiary basis" to find for the non-moving party on that issue.

No, because the Seventh Amendment affords the right to preservation of a jury trial. A judge may only order JMOL in response to a motion.

If a party's previous Rule 50(a) motion was denied, then they may move for renewed JMOL post-verdict. This motion must be made within 28 days following the court's entry of the judgment (or 28 days after jury's discharge if a trial wasn't reached). A Rule 59 motion for a new trial may be included.

1. Allow the jury's verdict to stand
2. Order a new trial
3. Grant the motion for JMOL

1. Order a new trial
2. Remand to the trial court to determine whether a new trial should be ordered
3. Reinstate the jury's verdict, or enter a new judgment

1. Rule 50(a): During a jury trial, but before the case has been submitted to a jury
2. Rule 50(b): Post-verdict, but only if the moving party already attempted a Rule 50(a) motion.

Established that a party moving for JMOL under Rule 50(a) must also renew the motion under Rule 50(b) after the verdict if they want an appeals court to review the sufficiency of the evidence. Here, SCOTUS held that the appellate court lacked authority to review the sufficiency of the evidence because the defendant had not filed a renewed 50(b) motion.

1. Expressly prohibits challenges on the legal sufficiency of evidence when a Rule 50(b) motion was not raised first in front of the trial judge.
2. Does not prohibit review of actual trial errors, or the ability to order a new trial.

True, as long as the appeals court finds actual errors in the trial proceedings

True

Yes, the defendant initially filed their Rule 50(a) and Rule 50(b) motions at the same time. Then, they filed another Rule 50(b) motion and a Rule 59 motion post-verdict

Before or at the close of evidence, a party may file written requests for the jury instructions that it wants. The court must then inform the parties of its proposed instructions, and provide the parties oppurtunities to object on the record before the instructions are delivered. Parties must state the matter objected to, and the grounds. This process is not heard by the jury.

Special verdict form

-General verdicts (finding for the plaintiff or defendant, generally)
-General verdicts with SROGs (general verdict form with written responses to one or more issues)
-Special verdicts (special written findings as to each issue)

General verdicts with SROGs require written responses to one or more issues, and special verdicts require written findings on each issue

If that party prevails, the verdict may be vacated on appeal

The objections are waived and unappealable, unless the appeals court finds that "substantial rights" were effected due to "plain error" in the instructions.

A mistrial is declared, and a new trial is ordered

If the jury's general verdict form is inconsistent with its written answers, the judge must enter judgment as long as those written answers are all consistent with one another. If the written answers are inconsistent, the judge must either ask the jury to reconsider their answers, or order a new trial.

After a jury or bench trial, a court may order a new trial for some or all of the issues either by motion, or sua sponte. The reason must be specified in the order. A party's motion for a new trial must be made no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment.

Weight of evidence, errors of law, misconduct, new evidence, shockingly excessive or inadequate damages, etc.

Yes, if there has been a "miscarriage of justice".

An example case in which an appeals court weighed evidence in its decision to grant a new trial. Here, the jury's finding for the plaintiff represented a "miscarriage of justice" because his testimony about his supposed purchase of jewelry items directly contradicted defendant's evidence of his bank records.

When granting JMOL, judges are prohibited from weighing the sufficiency of the evidence at trial. When granting a new trial, judges may consider weight of the evidence as one reason to grant a new trial.

No, harmless errors are errors that are not material to a jury's verdict. On the other hand, errors that have a "substantial rights" of a party may be the basis to order a new trial.

True, this is referred to as Remittitur.

False. Additur is not allowed. However, the judge may order a new trial.

Established that an appellate court may enter JMOL itself without remanding to the trial court if it concludes that no legally sufficient evidence supports a jury verdict. Here, SCOTUS held that the plaintiff’s expert testimony was inadmissible, so the appellate court properly determined that no reasonable jury could have found for the plaintiff.

True, particularly if evidence at trial was inadmissible such that it could not have supported a reasonable jury's verdict.

A party may move to alter or amend a judgment no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment. The court can only grant this motion if there have been newly-discovered evidence or if there were "manifest errors of law or fact".

The court held that such motions are only granted for newly discovered evidence or manifest errors of law or fatc, not for the relitigation of old matters.

False

False, the evidence would have to have been discovered after the entry of judgment

A party may move for relief from a judgment or order (including a default judgment) for one of the following reasons:

1) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect
2) Newly discovered evidence (which could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59
3) Fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by the opposing party
4) The judgment is void (ex: lacking SMJ)
5) Any other reason

True, Rule 60(b) applies.

Mistake, newly-discovered evidence, and fraud/misrepresentation/misconduct

Void judgment and "any other reason"

False, their review should be limited to whether or not the jury had a reasonable evidentiary basis for their verdict.

The judge may rule for the moving party, not by weighing the evidence, but instead by determining that the jury has no reasonable evidentiary basis for its verdict.

Abuse of discretion, which is a high standard and rare.

Attachment: The seizure of real or personal property to prevent the defendant from disposing of it, pending litigation
Garnishment: The defendant's assets are turned over to the plaintiff to satisfy an alleged debt
Replevin: Wrongfully taken or held personal property is returned to the plaintiff pending resolution of the ownership dispute
Sequestration: Property whose ownership is disputed is taken from the possessor and held by a neutral third-party pending resolution of an ownership dispute

Mostly after judgment, but sometimes before

Prejudgment attachments must comport with constitutional due process requirements, with respect to 1) the defendant's private interest at stake, 2) the risk of erroneous deprivation and probable value of additional or alternative safeguards, and 3) the plaintiff's interest and governent'd interests. Here, CT's statute allowing plaintiffs to obtain prejudgment attachment on real property without prior notice, a hearing, a showing of extraordinary circumstances, or the posting of a bond, was unconstitutional.

1) Private interest that will be affected by the prejudgment measure (what would the party be deprived of? would it be a substantial impariment?)
2) Risk of erroneous deprivation and probable value of additional/alternative safeguards (notice, hearing, bond, allowing adverse party to present more evidence, etc.)
3) Principal attention to the interest of the party seeking the prejudgment remedy and due regard for any government interest (what does the plaintiff actually gain from this? does it burden the state?)

Money judgments are enforced by writs of execution unless the court directs otherwise. Execution procedures must accord with the procedure of the state where the court is located, but federal statute still governs where applicable.

Judgment creditors/successors in interest may obtain discovery from any person, including the judgment debtor, in the aid of enforcing a judgment or execution. The procedure is decided by FRCP, or the state where the court is located

An enforcement procedure in which property is seized, or seized and sold, pursuant to a writ of execution.

An enforcement procedure pursuant to a court order, in which money or property of a third property is seized to satisfy a debt owed by a debtor to a creditor (usually wages from an employer).

Generally no - the judgment is considered final, so the debtor would have needed to raise issues before judgment, or on appeal. However, if there was a default judgment, the debtor may attempt collateral attack (if the court lacked PJ or SMJ) to void the judgment

No, while the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the constitution means that judgment must be recognized in other states, to seize any out of state property, judgment creditors need to obtain writs of execution within the state in which a property is located.

Plaintiffs seeking preliminary injunctions must establish that they are 1) likely to succeed on the merits, 2) likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, 3) that the balance of equities tips in their favor, and 4) that the injunction is within the public interest.

District court has broad discretion, including the discretion to require no bond at all

If requiring bond would have the effect of denying the plaintiff their right to judicial review of administrative action, a court may choose not to require them to post bond.

Harm that is "unlikely to materialize or purely theoretical will not do". Harm that is based on "something more than conjecture, surmise, or a party's substantial fears of what the future may have in store" suffices.

When the alleged injuries cannot adequately be compensated either by a later issued permanent injunction, after a full adjudication on the merits, or by a later issued damages remedy.

True

True

False, irreparable harm has to be likely, not just possible

The TRO can last for no longer than 14 days, but the court may extend it once for another 14 days for good cause. Any further extension requires the restrained party's consent

Federal courts usually follow state law for civil disputes, but if a federal rule applies, then it governs.

SCOTUS can make procedural rules for federal courts, but these rules cannot change substantive rights.
If FRCP and a federal statute conflict on a procedural matter, then FRCP governs, but if the statute is substantive, then the statute controls.

True

FRCP will govern

The federal statute will govern

Yes, due to the FF&FC Clause, but additional steps are necessary to execute on a property

The goal of the Erie decision was to promote uniformity of law throughout the US, and allow plaintiffs to chose their own forum. In diversity actions, federal courts are to apply a state's substantive common law, since there is no general federal common law and these are not federal question actions.

True

Federal procedural rules govern in federal courts even when state procedural rules are more restrictive. Here, a plaintiff served a defendant pursuant to Rule 4, but the defendant argued that service was improper under MA state law, in order to dismiss the claim, knowing that the SOL had already run pursuant to MA state law. SCOTUS clarified that service is procedural, not substantive, and therefore the state law wouldn't apply.

1) Was the cause of action based on state law?
2) Does a FRCP or federal statute exist to resolve the issue of state law?
3) If there's no conflict between the federal authority and the state law, then the court can apply both the federal authority and the state law. If there is a conflict, then: 1) verify that the federal authority is constitutional under REA (it always is), 2) verify that the conflicting rules are truly procedural and not substantive (procedural rules effect ways in which you plead, substantive rules effect merits of a claim)

Use when the applicable federal authority is from "federal common law" (issues that aren't addressed by constitution, federal statutes, or FRCP)
1. Would using the federal common law cause forum-shopping or inequity?
2) If so, then refer to state procedural law
3) If no, then: is the federal court's interest in using the federal common law stronger than the state court's interest in using their state law? If so, use federal law, if not, use state law

1) Recognize the conflict: Explain that procedural laws determine how rights are enforced, and that substantive laws determine how rights are defined
2) Use Eerie/Hanna/Shady Grove to argue both sides: Identify what is substantive/why state law could govern, and what is procedural/why federal law would govern

SCOTUS allowed a class action under Rule 23 to proceed against Allstate, despite a NY statute prohibiting it. The relevant question was what the rule regulates, not whether it affects substantive rights (since most procedural rules do).

Once a federal court has determined under the Erie doctrine that it must apply state law, they will have to follow the choice-of-law rules of the state in which they sit.

Ex: If a suit was filed in Florida federal court, then it would use Florida's state choice of law principles.

If venue was proper, the choice of law would follow to the transferred venue. If venue was improper, the transferee court would apply the choice-of-law of the new forum.

The courts of appeals has jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of US district courts. So, only once a district court has reached a final decision in a matter may the appeals courts be permitted to hear an appeal.

A final resolution of a case such that nothing remains to be done at the trial level, except enforcement

Within 30 days from the entry of the judgment (or orther order)

A judgment is “final” only when the district court has ruled on the issue and granted the relief requested. Additionally, courts of appeals must verify their own jurisdiction even if the parties never question it. Here, the district court granted summary judgment but did not grant any of the relief requested (no injunction, damages, or attorneys’ fees). SCOTUS held that the court of appeals therefore lacked jurisdiction.

Allows the immediate appeal of interlocutory orders that are unrelated to the merits of the action, when those orders would not be susceptible to review on appeal from a final judgment

A court order that is issued before the final resolution of a case. It decides something along the way, but does not end the litigation, so it is not a final judgment.

True. If a party wanted to appeal before a final judgment, they would need to:
1) Within 10 days of the order from which they would like to appeal, file an application in district court to certify the order
2) If the district court certifies the order, then the appeals court can decide to grant or deny the interlocutory order

Yes, they can be appealed, but generally not immediately. Preliminary injunctions however may be immediately appealable.

A party may seek a discretionary appeal of an interlocutory order that is not otherwise immediately appealable by filing an application to the district court within 10 days of the order. The district court may certify the order if 1) it involves a controlling question of law, 2) there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion, and 3) an immediate appeal may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.

If the district court certifies it, then the appeals court can chose to accept or deny the interlocutory appeal.

-Factual determinations made by a jury (JMOL itself is reviewable, jury's facts are not)
-Trial objections
-Interlocutory rulings challenged by a verdict-loser that didn't actually effect the final outcome of a case (aka, "harmless errors")
-Interlocutory rulings challenged by a verdict-winner

1) De novo: No deference is given to trial court's decision. Reserved for questions of law
2) Clear error: Deference is given to trial judge's factual determinations, and reverses are made when the district court is "clearly wrong"
3) Abuse of discretion: Most deferential. The trial judge's decision stands as long as there is some rational basis for the decision and proper legal standard was used, even if the appeals court disagrees with the decision. Applies to most decisions connected with the conduct of the trial process.

De novo review, because it gives no deference to a trial court's decision

Abuse of discretion, because it evaluates whether proper legal standards were applied to the issue, even if the appeals court disagrees with the lower court judge's opinion.

Interpretation of law (statutes, genuine dispute of material fact, whether a claim for relief was stated), jurisdiction, admissibility of evidence

False, de novo review pertains to questions of law, not factual findings themselves

Defendants appealed the denial of its motion for JMOL, its motion for a new trial, and allegedly erroneous jury instructions. The appeals court affirmed all decisions of the lower court.

"Clear error" for the findings of fact, because an appeals court would only overturn a court's findings of fact if they were clearly wrong, and "de novo" for the conclusions of law, because the court is permitted to interpret law.

False, conclusions of law are reviewed de novo

False, because abuse of discretion is about determining whether the lagl standards were applied correctly by the lower court, not the facts themselves

Claims are not precluded in a subsequent proceeding if a party previously lacked the legal ability to raise them in the first proceeding. Here, an employee's Title VII claim submitted through a state agency was not precluded in their subsequent federal court proceeding because the state agency could not award the compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorney’s fees that the employee was seeking in federal court.

Prevents "claim splitting", the relitigation of claims that have been (or should have been) consclusively resolved between the same parties in a preceding action.

1) Prior action must have concluded in a valid final judgment on the merits
2) Claim must be the same as the claim that was raised, or should have been raised in the prior action (same transaction or occurence test)
3) Parties in the subsequent action must be identical to (or in privity with) the parties in the prior action

Successor-in-interest. For example, if you repaired a car, and then sold the car to someone else, the buyer is the successor-in-interest.

An airplane enthusiast sought public records regarding an airplane model, which was denied. His friend then sought the same public records. The company raised claim preclusion as an affirmative defense, but here, the court held that the friends' close alignment was not enough to establish that they were effectively the "same parties" under claim preclusion because everyone should have the right to their own day in court.

1) Those who agree to be bound by the determination in litigation involving others
2) Successors-in-interest (like successive owners of a property)
3) Nonparties who were adequately represented in the prior litigation (like class actions, trusteeseneficiaries, fiduciaries)
4) The nonparty actually controlled the prior suit (directed or financed it)
5) Representative/agent of a person who was already represented in the prior litigation, or who is bound by a final judgment

The representation of a nonparty is considered adequately met only if 1) the interests of the partyepresentative were aligned and, 2) the party knew they were acting in a representative capacity or the court in the prior litigation protected the interests of the nonparty. Additionaly, sometimes notice of the original suit to the persons alleged to have been represented will be considered.

True, Taylor v. Sturgell is an example of this

False

Jury or bench trial judgment
Summary judgment
JMOL
Judgment on the pleadings
Default judgment
12(b)(6) dismissals with prejudice
Involuntary dismissal (failure to prosecute or comply with court orders)

Dismissal for lack of SMJ
Dismissal for lack of PJ
Dismissal for improper venue
Dismissal for failure to join a required party
Voluntary dismissal without prejudice

Here, a nurse sued a staffing agency in a prior action and the hospital that had hired her through the staffing agency in a subsequent action. The hospital argued that the nurse's claim against it was precluded because it was in privity with the staffing agency. However, the court held that there was no privity between them because they had different legal interests.

The claim-preclusive effect of a diversity judgment is determined by the law of the state where the federal court sat (the rendering forum), not the law of the second forum. Here, Semtek's diversity suit in CA federal court was dismissed under CA’s SOL. Semtek then filed the same claim in MD, and the defendant attempted to raise claim preclusion. SCOTUS reversed MD's appellate preclusion ruling and remanded it to MD district court to apply CA's law.

Under the Semtek holding, the state law of the rendering forum state controls.

States differ in their claim preclusion doctrines, including in whether or not they give dismissals based on SOLs claim-preclusive effects in other states

True, but the claim-preclusive effect could of course change if the appeal succeeds.

Here, NCTH-WA received an arbitration award against ZTE USA, confirmed in a federal court in FL. When NTCH attempted to bring anaction against ZTE Corp out of state, a circuit court found that the claim was precluded under FL state law due to the FF&FC clause. Under FL state law, this second action was precluded because the relief requested was the same, required the same evidence, and there was privity between ZTE USA and ZTE Corp.

Seek relief from judgment under Rule 60 to have the prior judgment’s effects vacated or modified

True

Claim preclusion (res judicata): Prevents the relitigation of both claims that have been conclusively resolved between the same parties, as well as claims that were never litigated but could have or should have been

Issue preclusion (collateral estoppel): Forcloses litigation of a matter that has been litigated and decided

1) Same issue was raised in the prior action resulted in a valid final judgment
2) Issue must have been actually litigated in the prior action
3) Resolution of the issue must have been necessary to the judgment of the prior action
4) Same parties or privies (this requirement has been relaxed in most jurisdictions)

A defendant that lost on factual issues in a prior equitable action cannot have those same issues relitigated in a later jury trial brought by different plaintiffs. Here, SCOTUS held that Parklane had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the truthfulness of its proxy statement in the earlier SEC bench trial, and the absence of a jury in that action did not matter. Because Shore’s suit relied on the same false proxy statement, Parklane had no 7th Amendment right to relitigate the issue before a jury and was bound by the prior adverse findings.

When a new plaintiff uses issue preclusion offensively to stop a defendant from disputing an issue that they already lost on in a prior case against a different plaintiff. In other words, because the defendant already lost once, they don’t get a second chance, even though the party in the subsequent action was not a party in the prior case.

Issue preclusion has a dual purpose of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue with the same party or privy, and of promoting "judicial economy" (preventing needless litigation).

Whether the party against whom issue preclusion is being sought actually had a full and fair oppurtunity to litigate

An issue is “actually litigated” only if it was raised, contested, and submitted for determination in the prior proceeding. Here, a petitioner argued that a later finding that he supported a terrorist organization was precluded because he had previously been granted asylum. The court held that his alleged support for the organization was not actually litigated during the asylum proceeding, because granting asylum did not require the agency to decide that issue, so the government could litigate it in the subsequent proceeding.

1) Same issue: Yes; negligence of the helicopter company
2) Actually litigated: Yes; VT considered evidence and rendered a jury verdict
3) Necessarily decided: Yes; Helicopter company's negligence was essential to the VT jury verdict
4) Same parties/privity: Yes; while she was not a party to the VT suit, modern law allows her to raise nonmutual offensive issue preclusion

However, even though each of these elements are satisfied, the judge ultimately decides based on fairness Here, we have three contradictory prior verdicts, so the court would deny her attempt to bind the helicopter company so as to avoid cherry-picking from favorable verdicts.

When the predecessor lacked SMJ to assert a claim in the first suit, either because the claim would have destroyed diversity, or because supplemental jx would not have been allowed against parties joined under Rules 14, 19, 20, or 24. In these situations, the claim wasn't actually available to be raised in the prior action.