PHIL 237 Final

other things being equal, it right to maximize the number of lives saved under given constraints (consequentialism)

other things being equal, it's right to maximize the number of lives saved below a reasonable lifespan (R) or, given all lives below R being saved, it's right to maximize the number of lives saved above R

scarcity of resources

death is bad for a person because they miss out on the potential good of life

the closer and more relevant the health care resource under consideration is to the event of death, the tighter and more restrictive the definition of a priority group must be

priority

high risk of death patients are first priority while old patients are second; gives comfort to worst off and responds to patients who are most urgent

1. priority between preventative care for higher-priority groups and treatment of symptomatic patients

yes it is okay, but not when ICU beds are unoccupied

reducing premature deaths, reducing economic and social deprivations, and reducing community transmission

proportional allocation for all countries (regardless of one's socioeconomic status), then maximizing the impact of a limited supply of vaccines

restriction on a persons freedom against their will is only permissible if and only if the bad of the restriction is outweighed by a sufficiently large sum of good that the restriction does to them and others

restrictions on a persons freedom against their will is only permissible if it prevents harm to another

restrictions on a persons freedom against their will is only permissible if it prevents harm to themselves

agreements on basic fundamental principles (ex. equality, democracy, respect for diversity)

agreements on a deeper level (ex. specific policy positions), will require deeper negotiation and communication

its ineffective and ethically wrong to "test all" people

although few HCTs have had incidents, over time there could be many as a result

difference between total number of deaths from all causes during a certain period and an average of the number of deaths during the same period in the past several years

other things being equal, its right to maximize the number of life years saved under given restraints

who gets resources first, next, and last

who gets the resources and who doesn't get any resources

who gets more resources and who gets less

flip a coin, everyone gets a 50% chance, leave it up to "fate"

death is never bad for that person as they don't know what they could have missed out on; they no longer exist

priority

priority

yes it is okay, the unvaccinated people were reasonably expected to get vaccinated

it is not acceptable for critical care, but unvaccinated people must pay some price for not being vaccinated

when a government of a country gives priority to its own residents over non-residents in the provision of vaccines

- assessment of the impact of a pandemic and how a nation responds/ responded in the past

ethical- causes of climate change are ethics based, climate change policy requires ethical considerations at intergenerational and international levels

a study that compares the costs and benefits to society of providing a public good

parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent, and minimize the causes of climate change (too weak or too broad)

not just technological enhancements but adapting laws

any human intervention to reduce the sources or enhance the sinks of GHGs

establishing fair procedures in relevant institutions

allocating essential and scarce resources fairly

compensating those who have been harmed from poor distribution

the polluter should bear the expenses of carrying out the pollution prevention and control measures to ensure that the environment is in an acceptable state

the larger the benefit one gains from global warming activities, the larger one's share of responsibility to mitigate the problem

if a party is able to reduce or prevent harm then, other things being equal, it may be required to pay to do so

the competition of developed countries to create new technology and policies to mitigate climate change and be innovators in reducing carbon emissions

each generation is forced to burn fossil fuels to cope with climate change, making it worse for every preceding generation

The idea that individuals are not made worse off by being born unless they can be said to have a life not worth living.
(1) We have a decision between a risky policy or a safe policy, and we choose the risky policy.
(2) Due to its scale, choosing the risky policy will ramify pervasively into the social world.
(3) (2) will cause different people to have been born than would have been born under the safe policy.
(4) The lives of the people born under the risky policy will be worth living.
(5) Therefore, they cannot blame us for the quality of the world they are bequeathed since the only other option
for them (for example, the world under the safe policy) is non-existence.

defines actions as right or wrong

attitudes of blame are directed at the victim of harm

some victim is harmed only if they are worse off than they would have been under some alternative scenario

we are required to maintain for future

focuses on the idea that individuals form social contracts or agreements to govern their behavior and interactions within society

a particular "game" between two captured prisoners that illustrates why cooperation is difficult to maintain even when it is mutually beneficial

the notion that since individual contributions to some process or outcome are irrelevant to that process or outcome, making those individual contributions is irrational

it isn't rational to apply the negligibility thesis to climate change

emitting carbon is not morally innocent when you are one of many, you're actions trigger positive feedback loops, and the remaining space in carbon budget should go to developing nations

courage, benevolence, hope

frugality, humility, and respect

all individual duties of justice are defined by and limited to the principles and regulatory arrangements of just institutions

1. deny that we have any duties of justice
2. individuals pick up slack for missing institutions

work collectively to build just institutions

seeing to it that, for every unit of carbon you emit, an equivalent amount is prevented from being emitted

Kant was right that our duties to other animals arise from our duties to ourselves, yet he was wrong that we don't owe duties to other animals. Animals don't make claims on us, so we make claims on ourselves on their behalf insofar as we see them falling outside the protection of our moral laws

our treatment of animals is highly context dependent

animals do not have the same moral status as humans, but humans treating animals poorly is reflective of a poor moral status for humans

all animal farming practices and individual consumption of these is morally wrong

it is typically morally wrong to use animal products (McPherson)

overall benefits to humans do not outweigh this strong moral reason against farming animals; people should and can be vegan

at least humanely farming animals for their meat and byproducts and consuming those products is morally permissible (Cuneo)

minimizing animal harm, in our non-ideal circumstances, sometimes requires eating some animals out of compassion for them (Christopher Bobier)

it is typically morally wrong to aim to benefit by cooperating with the wrongful element of others plans

one morally ought not symbolically support an essentially wrong practice, which provides some good G, if there are readily available and comparable alternatives to G

a strict plant-based diet still involves animal harm; Bobier's argument for New Omnivorism

the virtuous person cares about animals and seeks to minimize animal harm; Bobier's argument for New Omnivorism

incorporating animals that don't experience pain- hence cannot be harmed- in ones diet minimizes the amount of animal harm done; Bobier's argument for New Omnivorism

incorporating free animal products in ones diet will minimize the number of animals harmed in production

our actions today will determine how much longer humanity survives (how many future generations there are), we can affect how well or how badly the lives of future people are for as long as humanity survives (this is determined by the significance, persistence, and contingency of our actions

AGI could "lock-in" whatever values we, as a society, have/ is dominant at the time

longtermist thinking will dominate expected value calculations in practice by ruling out any moral views that say saving people alive today is more important than saving future lives, theoretical issues arise because we should be uncertain about longtermism's handling of uncertainty, especially regarding climate change and space colonization

life cannot be meaningful in VR, humans want to do things, be things, and have physical contact with reality

yes, life can be meaningful, VR isn't illusionary and it isn't always programmed; believes hedonism, experientalism, desire-satisfactionism, and ubuntu can all align with his view

something is good for someone to the extent that it gives them pleasure and no pain

something is good for someone to the extent that it gives positive (conscious) experiences (missing in VR)

something is good for someone to the extent that it satisfies their desires (missing in VR)

something is good for someone to the extent that it provides them with valuable things such as knowledge, health, etc. (missing in VR)

something is good for someone to the extent that it provides compassion/ respect for ones community, social relationship value (missing in VR)

yes, just as much as real lives, its not okay to kill simulated people to save an ordinary person unless the simulated person is not conscious (we should create duplicates of best possible simulations, then second best, then third best...)

we should try our best to produce the best of all possible simulations, then create duplicates of that simulation to increase happiness

the ethics of VR worlds is equivalent to the ethics of fictional worlds

right thing to do is whatever maximizes utility/ well-being for everyone affected by ones actions

the ethics of VR worlds is equivalent to the ethics of real-world

how can virtual fictionalism say you can steal something that doesn't exist? Chalmers says you CAN steal virtual objects

if it would be wrong for subjects to have an experience in reality, it would be wrong to allow them to in virtual reality

even if goods and services are fairly distributed in VR worlds, society cannot be egalitarian if there are unequal balances of domination, oppression, and power