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scientific debate focus on agential control : are our actions caused by conscious intentions ?

philosophical debate focus on the question wether we 'could have done otherwhise' if determinism is true

free will ass having alternative posibilities

do we actually have other alternatives?

e.g. the phedophile case?

every even tis necessitiated by **antecedent events** and **conditions** together with **laws of nature**

if an intlect could know all forces at a certain moment that set nature in motion

submit data to amnalyisis → embrace in single formula

we would be certain of the future and it would be (just like the past) present before our eyes

free will is incompatible with determinism

1. libertinism : free will does exist and determinism is false
2. hard determinsim : free will does not exist and determinism is true

free will is compatible with determinism

if deteminism is true → our acts are the conseuqnces of the laws of nature and events in the remote past

it is not up to us what went on before we were vorn

neither it is up to us what the laws of nature are

we cannot do otherwhise than we actually do, theorfor we do not have alternative posibilities

free will requires that it is 'up to us' what we choose, in the sence that we need to be the origin or source of our action

you are beginning of a new causal chain, and no conditions external are sufficint for your action

what is 'you'? an immaterial soul ? an ego? consciousness?

libertarianism in not very popular because it collapses into substance dualism

ascendent porblem

descendent problem

show that free will is incompatible with determinism

show that free will is compatible with indeterminism

undeterminated events happen by chance

if our choice is the result of undetermined brain porcesses, does this amount to a free and responsible choice?

the importance of 'felf

qunatum mechanic intermininacy at the natural leve?

lbertarianist concept of free will is correct

but since determinism is true → we don''t have that

we like to think that people have alternative possibilities so we can hold the responsible

but we hold them responsible so that we can punish them and satisfy our moral anger

legal system is based on liberianist concept of free will

punishment should be replaced with preventive derainment : remove potential criminals form general public to prevent future harmful actions

just like we isolate individuals who carry a contageous illness

denies that free will and determinism are incompatible

an analysis of an alternativ epossibiities requirment

what does " up to us" mean ?

could I have done otherwhise, if I had decided to do so ?

if you decided otherwhise, this would have happened in another world, and in that world everything is determined as well

but what is the status of thse worlds? do they actually exist? if they do, compatinilism turns out to be dualistic/pluristic

they are "imagined" → result of our cognitive capacities

and in the actual world , these cognitive capacieites are determined as well

compatibilism agrues that the fact that free actions are determine dby our character motives, past etc is a good thing

Dannet's interpretation of Martin Luther : "here i stand, I can do no other"

but how important are alternative possibilities for our concept of free will?

focus is on moral responsability rather than free will ( as having alternatives )

Strawson's reactive attitudes

Frankfurt's new compatiblism

holding each other responsible is based in 'recieve attitudes'(emotions such as represment, gratitude, frogiveness )

revising attitudes in interactions with others ( e.g. someone stepts on your head)

participating in scoial practice = potantial target of reflective attitudes

'objective attitude' towards patients, children etc = we do not hold them morally responsile

prolem : our reflective attitudes are misguided

since determinsim is true, we need to take the objctive attitude towards others ( and not hold them morally responsible )

counter argument : what matters is not wether someone could have done otherwhise, what counts is the resason why

(e.g. saying that the peron who stepped on your hand could't have done otherwhise is saying that she did not intend to step on ypur hand, she didn't mean to do you harm. And that makes a difference )

if the intentions are determined, then it is not clear how this makes a difference

we need to adoopt the objective attitude after all

distinction between freedom of action and freedom of will

'able to do what you want ' and 'able to want what you want;

what makes difference between animals and human beings is that we have 'second order desires'

e.g. "wanting to smoek" (fist order desire ) and "not wanting to want to smoke" ( second order desire)

we have free will if our second order desires ( pr 'volitions') align with our first orde desires

e.g. if you want ot quit soking (second order ) but you still want to smoke ( first order ) you are not free

the 'wanton' the 'unwilling addict' and the 'willing addict'

'**wanton**': has conflicting first order desires : he wants to take the drugs and he wants not to take it

not a person , does not candidate for freely willed action

no responsibility

**'unwilling addict'** : has second order violotion that her first order desrie to take the drug *is not his will*

does not take drug of his own free will

will conflicts at a higher level with what he wishes to be

no responsibility

**'willing addict**' by way of a second order volition, embraces his addcitive first order desire to take the drug →he wants to be as he is and acts on the desire

takes the drug of his own free will

responsibility

does the willing addict have free will ? he could have not fdone a=otherwhise due to the addiction

having alternative possibilities is not required for free will or moral responsibility

what matters is 'agential contol': having desires that you want to have

identification with our second order violations and the 'kind of person that we want to be'

the truth of determinism is initially taken very seriously as potential threath to free will

most copatiblist accounts of free will tend to ignore its implications

perhaps we should first consider whether determinism is actually true

determinism is a conditional assumption : do we need to take it seriously?

quatum mechanics is about probabilities nad probablities are not determined

does not show that the measured brain activity neccerly leads to flexing your wrist

neural porcesses are explained in terms of probablity ( e.g. neurotransmitter releases and the neuron fire )

neuron does not fire 100% of time but we say it does

when we actually refer to a probablity

processes describes as stochastically

other than physics there is scientific worry about determinism in scientifc development in fields like neurosxince, social and moral psychology

does experiment show that my action is the result of brain porcesses rather than my conscius intention?

subjects have to consciously try and stop the upcoming movement

Libert: since conscious intention preced the action by 200 miliseconds, we still have some consciouness to beto this action

not free will but free "won't"

if action is caused by brain processes rather then conscious intention, same might be true for veto

veto experiment does not undermine the assumption that we have alternative possiblities on the contrary

experiment implies that subjects initially did not have the intention to move

cannot be the unconscious intention to act

the intention to move is not formed when we become consicouns of being about to act much earlier

conscuius untentions might still play a role

W judgements depend on introspection

Dennet : Liber's judgement "W" is a myth, conscious decision is not a point in time and canot be localozed in the brain

in some studies conscious intention was actually found before the RP in some subjects

1. much control do we actually have ?
2. Mele shoed that Libert style experiment still allow for causal role of conscious intention
3. confabulation and choice blindness indicate than conscious intentions do not alweys cause action
4. ecological validity

Libert style experiments about prediction or determination ?

if we cann predict 100% certainty what you will do , is this a problem for free will ?

what happens is neccerly the result of antecedent states of affairs

you actually already know what will happen

you are very ill and it has already been determined wether you will become better or not

does it make sense to go and see the doctor ?

common response : no matter what I do , it will not matter

as long as you don't know what will happen going to the dcotor might be the way to get better

even if this decision is determined, you still have to devide !

determinsim + knownelge = problem for free will

if everything is determined and we know with 100% what will happen, then it does not matter what we do

this is what Laplacian Demon is about : predictability

these oredictions can only be generated from a God's eye pont of view, i.e. by someone who is not part of what is to be predicted ( a closed system )

Heinsber's uncertainity pronciple shows that even the Laplacian Demin might be impossible

uncertainty pronciple : we cannot measure the position (x) and momentum (p) of a particle with absolute precision