Voter Participation

an ordering of individuals along the policy space.

Imagine there are two policies. One of them (p) is more to the right than the other (p’) and let’s say the axis is going from the extreme left to the extreme right. So p > p’ (more right = higher).

Then, consider individuals depending on how rightist or leftist they are based on their preferences and order them according to their $\alpha_i$.

It means that an individual who is considered more on the right respective to another individual will also prefer the right-wing policy over the left-wing one

- SIMILAR CONSTITUENCIES: Electing a Democrat or a Republican is random
- SAME MEDIAN VOTER: D. and R. representatives should vote similarly in Congress in that case

The authors use Regression Discontinuity Design via Close Election to test this
assumption. They study the causal impact of electing a Democratic (vs Republican)
Representative on their vote in Congress, holding other variables constant.

No median voter.

There is only one dimension of the political spectrum that is common to every
constituency in the United States.
If two constituencies vote similarly, then, as their demographic characteristics
are perfectly similar, every constituency shares the same median voter or in
other words, the same ideology.

Individuals will vote if the expected material benefit of doing so exceeds the expected cost

Non material social benefit
Monetary benefit

$p_i B_i >= C_i$

Key words: pivot probability, material benefit, cost of voting

For elections with large electorates (many voters), $p_i$ is tiny and the cost of voting is never zero even in advanced economies (transport, missing work etc). Therefore, the conditions determining voter participation may be rarely met and yet the average turnout in the UK is 60%

The issue would remain for plausible levels of altruism also (ie if $B_i$ included caring about her material benefit and the one of others)

- Solution 1: Add extra terms
- Solution 2: Vary the rationality assumption
- Solution 3: Endogenise some terms.

$p_i B_i + D_i>= C_i$

Key words: pivot probability, material benefit, direct benefit, cost of voting

Material benefit perceived by i from i’s preferred policy being implemented instead of another one. Note that it can be defined more broadly than i’s own material self-interest

Direct benefit not multiplied by p - achieved just by the act of voting (e.g., being a « good » citizen), not associated with the result.

Citizens obtain Di whether their vote is pivotal (with likelihood pi) or not (with likelihood 1- pi )

If Ci is small, even modest Di would explain why i votes

The DPCT theorises two competing candidates converging towards the preferences of the median voter. In the swing voter theory, voters attempt to make elections close to be decisive in the vote and to potentially, threaten their preferred party if it does not commit to their preferred policy.

Endogenise $p_i$ and $C_i$ --> $p_i$(Turnout) and $C_i$(Turnout)

1) The more citizens turn out to vote, the less likely one individual is the Pivotal voter (i.e., changing the outcome of the vote)

2) In a society, everyone has a different marginal cost to vote. So when turnout increases, people with higher marginal costs vote as well

Equilibrium turnout a T* --> $p_pivotal-voter^*$ and $C_pivotal-voter^*$

- Add $D_i$ or increase $D_i$
- The marginal cost of voting decreases: the $C_i$ (Turnout) moves downward (e.g., Good weather)
- The marginal benefit $B_i$ increases (e.g., when the platforms are polarized)
- The Pivot-probability increases: the $p_i$(Turnout) shifts upward (e.g., a
higher likelihood of close elections)

In large elections, the observed turnout can still be plausibly explained
by adding Di

To endogenise p and C is not enough, it is better to rethink rationality (ie. include all three solutions)

- Introduces a non-standard view of rationality where individuals belong to groups

Suppose individuals vote for a referendum (or btwn two different political parties)
- Group 1 (supporters) and Group 2 (opponents)
- The group agrees on which electoral outcome is the best. Ex : Every voter in a group could share the same preferences over two alternatives YES or NO

Every individual in the group 'does their part' by voting
They want to maximise their group's aggregate utility and voting is therefore, a CIVIC DUTY for the group

Each individual in the group receives a benefit from seeing their preferred proposition elected BUT there is also an individual cost of voting

As every individual in a group follows to the same rule, individuals should know whether or not they have to vote to maximise the aggregate group utility

Every voter with an individual cost below $C_G$ votes

Such that the rule followed by the other group is taken as given and that all members of Group G follow the same rule (i.e will vote for the group's preferred option as long as their $C_i <= C_G$

when the entire group follows the same rule