1What is the opportunity cost of a choice?
1. The net benefit forgone from the best feasible alternative ruled out by that choice.
2. Net benefit means the alternative's benefit minus the costs you avoid by not taking it.
2What are the consumer's optimality conditions in the SCBA benchmark?
1. Maximise $U(x_1,x_2)$ subject to $q_1x_1+q_2x_2=m$.
2. At an interior optimum, $\frac{\partial U}{\partial x_i}=\lambda q_i$, for $i=1,2$.
3. $\lambda=\frac{\partial V}{\partial m}$ is the marginal utility of income.
3What is the utilitarian SWF in the SCBA benchmark?
1. $SWF=\sum_{h=1}^{H}U^h$: equal weight on each person's utility.
2. With $H$ identical consumers, $SWF=HU$.
4What is the welfare test for a project in the SCBA benchmark?
1. Undertake it if and only if $\Delta SWF>0$.
2. Extra output $\Delta x_1>0$ requires resources diverted from good $2$, sacrificing $\Delta x_2>0$ per capita.
3. Compare the welfare benefit of extra good $1$ with the welfare cost of forgone good $2$.
5What does a shadow price measure?
1. For an output: the marginal social welfare gained per additional unit supplied.
2. For an input: the marginal social welfare forgone elsewhere per additional unit used by the project.
3. Initially, these valuations are in welfare units per physical unit.
6How do shadow prices determine whether a small project raises welfare?
1. The project adds $\Delta x_1>0$ and sacrifices $\Delta x_2>0$, both per capita.
2. $\Delta SWF\approx v_1\Delta x_1-v_2\Delta x_2$.
3. Undertake it if this is positive: social benefit exceeds social opportunity cost.
7How are output shadow prices derived in the utilitarian benchmark?
1. Each consumer gains $\frac{\partial U}{\partial x_j}$ utility per additional unit of good $j$.
2. With $H$ identical consumers, $SWF=HU$.
3. Thus $v_j=H\frac{\partial U}{\partial x_j}$ for an increase in per-capita consumption.
8Why can consumer prices determine the welfare verdict in this benchmark?
1. Consumer optimisation gives $\frac{\partial U}{\partial x_j}=\lambda q_j$, so $v_j=H\lambda q_j$.
2. Hence $v_1\Delta x_1-v_2\Delta x_2=H\lambda(q_1\Delta x_1-q_2\Delta x_2)$.
3. Since $H\lambda>0$, both expressions have the same sign: the project raises welfare if $q_1\Delta x_1-q_2\Delta x_2>0$.
9How does a small project's input use determine forgone output?
1. Fixed factor supplies imply $\Delta l_0^2=-\Delta l_0^1$ and $\Delta k^2=-\Delta k^1$.
2. Thus $\Delta x_2\approx\frac{\partial F^2}{\partial l_0^2}\Delta l_0^1+\frac{\partial F^2}{\partial k^2}\Delta k^1$.
3. Each input diverted to the project sacrifices its marginal product in sector $2$.
10What are the input optimality conditions for a price-taking firm in sector $2$?
1. $p_2\frac{\partial F^2}{\partial l_0^2}=p_0$ and $p_2\frac{\partial F^2}{\partial k^2}=p_k$.
2. Each input's marginal revenue product equals its price.
11When does the project's input bill measure the value of forgone consumption?
1. Substituting firms' optimality conditions gives $q_2\Delta x_2\approx\frac{q_2}{p_2}(p_0\Delta l_0^1+p_k\Delta k^1)$.
2. If $q_2=p_2$, this becomes $q_2\Delta x_2\approx p_0\Delta l_0^1+p_k\Delta k^1$.
3. Thus, for a small project in this competitive benchmark, the input bill measures the social opportunity cost.
12When can market values be used to assess a project's welfare effect?
1. In the benchmark: price-taking, no taxes or subsidies, no unpriced externalities, and a small project with no price effects.
2. Undertake it if $q_1\Delta x_1-(p_0\Delta l_0^1+p_k\Delta k^1)>0$.
13What is a numeraire in SCBA?
1. The reference unit in which all benefits and costs are expressed.
2. Usually private income (money), though other choices are possible.
14How is a utility-unit shadow price converted into money?
1. Divide by $\lambda$, the marginal utility of income.
2. Under normalisation, $q_j^{SP}=\frac{v_j}{\lambda}=\frac{1}{\lambda}\frac{\partial U}{\partial x_j}$.
15Why must benefits and costs use the same numeraire?
1. Values in different units cannot be meaningfully subtracted.
2. A consistent change of numeraire rescales net benefits without changing the welfare verdict.
16Why might market prices fail to reflect social value?
1. Market power distorts prices.
2. Taxes and subsidies create wedges between consumer and producer prices.
3. Uncorrected externalities leave social costs or benefits unpriced.
17What further issues must SCBA address beyond the benchmark?
1. Missing markets: estimate shadow prices without observed market prices.
2. Unequal impacts: account for who gains and who loses.
3. Effects at different dates: use social discounting.
18How does a project-induced increase in supply affect consumer surplus in an undistorted market?
1. The market price decreases from $q_1^0$ to $q_1^1$.
2. Consumer surplus increases by area $FABG$.
19How does a project-induced increase in supply affect existing producers' surplus?
1. Existing producers move from $A$ to $C$ along their supply curve as the price decreases.
2. Their producer surplus decreases by area $FACG$.
3. The new project's revenue is accounted for separately.
20What is the net change in consumer and existing producer surplus in the Boardman diagram?
1. $\Delta CS=FABG$.
2. $\Delta PS=-FACG$.
3. $\Delta CS+\Delta PS=ABC$.
21How does the Boardman diagram illustrate the changes in consumer surplus, existing producer surplus and net social surplus?
22How is gross social benefit derived in the Boardman method?
1. $GSB=q_1^1\Delta x_1+\Delta CS+\Delta PS$.
2. $\Delta CS+\Delta PS=ABC=\frac12(q_1^0-q_1^1)\Delta x_1$.
3. $GSB=q_1^1\Delta x_1+\frac12(q_1^0-q_1^1)\Delta x_1$.
23How is the Boardman output shadow price derived in an undistorted market with linear demand and supply?
1. $q_1^{SP}=\frac{GSB}{\Delta x_1}$.
2. $q_1^{SP}=q_1^1+\frac12(q_1^0-q_1^1)$.
3. $q_1^{SP}=\frac12(q_1^0+q_1^1)$.
24Why does the Boardman method use an average shadow price?
1. A finite project changes market prices, so marginal valuations differ across units.
2. The average shadow price values the entire output: $q_1^{SP}\Delta x_1=GSB$.
3. For negligible price changes, $q_1^{SP}\approx q_1^0$.
25Why do small price changes have no first-order welfare effect in an undistorted competitive market?
1. $x_1$: Consumer demand; $y_1$: Producer supply.
2. Market clearing implies $x_1=y_1$.
3. Consumer and producer surplus effects cancel to first order.
26Why can pre-project prices approximate shadow prices for small projects?
1. Small price changes generate only second-order net surplus effects.
2. Hence, pre-project prices provide a first-order approximation to shadow prices.
27What is the practical difficulty of estimating Boardman shadow prices for large projects?
1. The post-project market price is unobserved.
2. Estimating it requires information on demand and supply elasticities.
28Why can small price changes affect welfare in a market with a pre-existing sales tax?
1. Consumer and existing-producer surplus effects cancel to first order.
2. Changes in consumption alter government tax revenue.
3. Hence, $\frac{\Delta V}{\lambda}\approx t_1\Delta X$, where $\Delta X$ is the change in consumption.
29How is gross social benefit calculated for a small project in a market with a sales tax?
1. $GSB\approx p_1\Delta G+t_1\Delta X$.
2. $\Delta G$: Additional project output; $\Delta X$: Increase in total consumption.
3. The terms represent project receipts and additional tax revenue.
30What is the output shadow price for a small project in a market with a pre-existing sales tax?
1. $q_1^{SP}=p_1+t_1\frac{\Delta X}{\Delta G}$.
2. If $\Delta X=\Delta G$, then $q_1^{SP}=p_1+t_1=q_1$.
3. If some output displaces private production, then $p_1<q_1^{SP}<q_1$.
31What is the Boardman output shadow price with substantial price changes and a pre-existing sales tax?
1. $q_1^{SP}\approx\frac12(p_1^0+p_1^1)+t_1\frac{\Delta x_1^c}{\Delta x_1}$.
2. $\Delta x_1^c$: Increase in consumption; $\Delta x_1$: Additional project output.
3. The tax adjustment captures additional government revenue per unit of project output.
32How is the social opportunity cost of project inputs calculated?
1. $OC=\text{Direct expenditure}-\Delta SS-\Delta TAX$.
2. $\Delta SS$: Change in social surplus of other market participants.
3. $\Delta TAX$: Change in government tax revenue.
33What is the shadow pricing rule for internationally traded goods in a small open economy?
1. For marginal changes met through imports or exports, shadow prices equal world market prices.
2. This holds even with domestic taxes or trade tariffs, assuming no externalities or other relevant distortions.
34How is the shadow price of an imported input derived when there is an import tariff?
1. Domestic price: $p_k=p_k^*+\tau$.
2. Project expenditure: $(p_k^*+\tau)\Delta k$.
3. Additional tariff revenue: $\tau\Delta k$.
4. Social opportunity cost: $OC=p_k^*\Delta k$, so $p_k^{SP}=p_k^*$.
35Why do world prices determine shadow prices for traded goods in a small open economy?
1. World prices are fixed, so marginal imports or exports can adjust without changing domestic prices.
2. Existing consumer and producer surplus remains unchanged.
3. Changes in government tax revenue offset the relevant tax wedges in domestic prices.
36How is the output shadow price defined in SCBA?
1. $q_1^{SP}=\frac{GSB}{\Delta x_1}$.
2. It measures the average social benefit per unit of project output.
37How is the output shadow price determined in an undistorted domestic market?
1. No price effects: $q_1^{SP}=q_1^0$.
2. Small price effects: $q_1^{SP}\approx q_1^0$.
3. Substantial price effects with linear curves: $q_1^{SP}=\frac12(q_1^0+q_1^1)$.
38How is the output shadow price determined with a pre-existing sales tax?
1. Small price effects: $q_1^{SP}\approx p_1+t_1\frac{\Delta x_1^c}{\Delta x_1}$.
2. Substantial price effects with linear curves: $q_1^{SP}\approx\frac12(p_1^0+p_1^1)+t_1\frac{\Delta x_1^c}{\Delta x_1}$.
3. $\Delta x_1^c$: Increase in consumption; $\Delta x_1$: Additional project output.
39How are shadow prices determined for internationally traded goods in a small open economy?
1. Outputs and inputs are valued at world market prices.
2. This holds even with trade taxes, provided marginal adjustments occur through imports or exports and there are no other relevant distortions.